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In this paper we problematize the metaphor of balance employed
in the area of information privacy. Using Actor-Network Theory
we conduct an historical investigation into the continuous release
of the same personal data over the course of eight decades.
Through the examination of actual enactments of balance over
time we find that, in practice, balancing acts are conducted at local
levels by local actor-networks within organizations, with limited
overall organizational knowledge, raising challenges around inter-
preting statements made by organizational spokespersons. We also
find a surprising lack of knowledge possessed by these local actor-
networks about what is subsequently done with personal data and
the extent to which networks that extend beyond the organization
gravitate towards and form around available data. Through tracing
and revealing this historical Actor-Network Theory investigation
provides a means of probing and examining actual acts of balance
in the area of information privacy and, through revelation, aid in
the creation of the possibility of bringing the act of balance more
in line with the concept.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Privacy is and has been a subject of interest to fields as diverse as psychology (Schwartz, 1968),
sociology (Rule, McAdam, Stearns, & Uglow, 1980; Winner, 1996), law (Solove, 2007; Warren & Bran-
deis, 1890), history (Flaherty, 1972; Westin, 1967) political science (Bennett, 1990) and philosophyd. All rights reserved.
ner), m.chiasson@lancs.ac.uk (M. Chiasson), agopal@ivey.uwo.ca (A. Gopal).
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cus on relationship marketing (Cespedes & Smith, 1993; Fournier, Dobscha, & Mick, 1998; Foxman &
Kilcoyne, 1993; Bloom, Milne, & Adler, 1994).
The field of MIS has a particular interest in privacy, information privacy, as designers of systems
and custodians of data. The often cited reference point for information privacy research is Mason’s
identification of four key ethical issues facing the field – privacy, accuracy, property, and accessibility
(Mason, 1986). He argues that ‘‘We [in the MIS community] must assume some responsibility for the
social contract that emerges from the systems that we design and develop” (Mason, 1986, p. 11). Since
then many MIS scholars have engaged in information privacy research (Clarke, 1988; Culnan, 1993;
Laudon, 1986; Stewart & Segars, 2002, to name only a few).
An important theme of this research is the metaphor of balance, invoked either through explicit
appeal (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Culnan & Bries, 2003) or through implication in the suggestion
of tradeoffs between individual information privacy and other goals (Smith, 1993). The appeal to this
metaphor is reflected in practice as well, as organizations explicitly refer to the goal of striking a bal-
ance either in policies (Royal Bank of Canada, 2007) or literature (Equifax Canada, 1993; Canadian
Standards Association, 2008). Indeed the Royal Bank of Canada privacy policy states that Canadian pri-
vate sector privacy legislation is ‘‘essentially about balance”. This ties in to the core issue identified by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in creating fair information
principles, ‘‘The need of balancing competing interests of privacy on the one hand and freedom of
information on the other” (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1980, p. 16.)
The appeal to balance and the implied employment of a scale makes intuitive sense. Privacy is one
right among many and legitimate tradeoffs can and must be made in the interests of society. Nonethe-
less, the appeal to the balance metaphor is not without its critics. These critiques focus specifically on
the enactment of balance, how it plays out in practice, and point to either imbalances of information
between individuals and organizations (Foxman & Kilcoyne, 1993; Shapiro, 1998) or imbalances in
power relationships (Clarke, 1988, 1999), both imbalances that work in favour of the interests of orga-
nizations. The arguments suggest that pre-existing imbalances shape real enactments of balance on
questions of information privacy.
Our historical investigation, sparked by the puzzling outcome of a local enactment of balance, looks
critically at how an appeal is made to the discourse and metaphor of balance and the employment of
scales, by examining and shedding light on an actual enactment of balance in practice. Using Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) we investigate this specific enactment by ‘following the data’, a critical but
rarely examined element in academic information privacy research, tracing the travels of specific per-
sonal data over almost eight decades.
Our findings raise two challenges to the metaphor of balance through making it clear that balance
has no specific meaning except in its enactment. First, our findings reveal that actual enactments of
balance for organizations are conducted by local actor-networks within the organization, rather than
by the organization as a whole. At this local level of enactment we find a surprising lack of knowledge
about what is done with personal information, which raises questions about the veracity and credibil-
ity of statements and assurances offered by organizational spokespersons. In effect, who is speaking
and what do they actually know? Second, we find that data, far from being an artifact or passive ob-
ject, is the catalyst that draws others to form associations with and around it and the threads that con-
nect these associations can extend in surprising directions, unknown to the organizations supplying
the data and certainly the individuals supplying personal data.
The structure of the rest of our paper is as follows. The next section sets up the specific case and
research questions followed by the theoretical lens and method employed. This is followed by the re-
search findings, discussion and conclusions.2. Setting and research question
We were aware of the dominance of the metaphor of balance in issues involving privacy and the
peculiar outcome of a local enactment of balance attracted our attention. The enactment stemmed
from a privacy audit conducted by the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner (OIPC)
Table 1
Unresolved privacy audit recommendations.
Establish controls over the collection and use of MVR information
Use fair information principles (FIP) to govern the collection and use of MVR data
Conduct audits on uses made of MVR data
Strengthen controls over the issuance of search accounts granting access to MVR data
Limit the release of drivers’ abstracts to that permitted by legislation
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Registry (MVR). The audit was requested by the government on the basis that,
‘‘The disclosure of this information [personal information in data banks], and. . . ensuring adequate
privacy practices are adopted – especially as they relate to the FOIP [the provincial Freedom of Infor-
mation and Privacy Protection] Act – is important to us” (Office of the Information and the Auditor
General of Alberta, 1998, p. 3).
The MVR contains the names, addresses, gender, weight, birth date, and hair and eye color of vehi-
cle owners in Alberta, as well as details about the owner’s registered vehicle. The privacy audit, con-
ducted in 1996–1997, produced 12 recommendations related to privacy. Seven recommendations
were accepted and acted upon by those responsible for the MVR, while five were accepted in principle
but action was deferred. The unresolved audit recommendations (Table 1) focused on the lack of con-
trol over the collection and use of MVR information, the advisability of applying fair information prin-
ciples (FIP) to govern the collection and use of MVR data in light of the partial exclusion of the MVR
from the privacy act (FOIP),1 the absence of audits by the government on uses made of the information,
weak controls over the issuance of search accounts granting access to MVR data, and the release of driv-
ers’ abstracts in circumstances not permitted by legislation (Office of the Information and Privacy Com-
missioner and the Auditor General of Alberta, 1998).
These unresolved recommendations were still outstanding two years later when a Legislative Com-
mittee of the government of Alberta issued a final report, after conducting a mandatory review of the
entire FOIP Act. The final report recommended no change to current MVR practices citing, ‘‘historical
purposes and practices” as justification (Select Special Freedom of Information, 1999, p. 32).
Given that the government requested the audit because of concern about privacy, we were sur-
prised and unable to explain how this concern was trumped by ‘‘historical purposes and practices”.
Indeed, we reviewed the 700 pages of the minutes of and submissions to the committee and were even
more puzzled. There was little reference in these documents to history generally and absolutely no
substantiation of historical purposes and practices. We had to conclude that, at least on the surface,
something unknown had somehow trumped privacy in this local enactment of balance.
This led to the development of our research question, starting with a more general one. ‘‘Why did
the scale employed in the enactment of balance tip away from the side representing privacy (impor-
tant to the government) in favor of the side representing the continued personal data sharing, when
there appeared to be little or no substance to the arguments placed on that side of the scale (‘‘histor-
ical purposes and practices”)? This led to the more specific question: ‘‘What is the actual constitution
of ‘‘historical purposes and practices”, that tilted the scale so decisively?”
3. Theoretical lens and method
Philosophical principles of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) informed the development of the research
question, particularly the work of Latour with his focus on ontology; the creation of and sustenance of
a particular reality (Latour, 1992). In this instance, the practice of selling MVR data was sustained by
the Legislative Committee that acted as a spokesperson (Latour, 1988) for what appeared to be a black
box (Latour, 1987), a sealed box of unknown substance with the label ‘‘historical purposes and1 The FOIP Act exempts uses made of records contained in the Office of the Motor Vehicle Registrar (Statutes of Alberta, 1994,
Chapter F-18.5, Section 4(1)(h)).
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argument placed opposite privacy in this enactment of balance.
Our lack of knowledge about what to expect led to the adoption of ANT as our lens for this research.
‘‘...ANT does not tell anyone the shape that is to be drawn – circles or cubes or lines – but only how to
go about systematically recording the world-building abilities of the sites to be documented and reg-
istered” (Latour, 1999a, p. 21). Each research subject has within it all that is needed to understand its
development. With this in mind we followed the key underlying methodological approach of ANT that
‘‘’follow[ing] the agents around’ has priority over everything” (Latour, 1999b, p. 128). An agent is
something or someone who either acts, forces others to act or can be enlisted into action (Latour,
1993).2 As ‘‘Nothing becomes real to the point of not needing a network in which to upkeep its existence”
(Latour, 1991, p. 118), we needed to answer the ‘‘How?” question; how was this practice sustained?
ANT is a constructivist philosophy positing that all action is local and is taken for local reasons. It is
only through alignment with others that something larger and more pervasive appears (networks,
linked local actor-networks). Others enlist in a program and form networks only if they see their inter-
ests realized in the alignment. Thus, a successful alignment is one that has permitted drift and trans-
lations around an idea so that different local actor-networks see their interests met through taking
action. Holmstrom and Stalder (2001) document the consequence of a retail information system spon-
sor’s failure to accommodate critical user interests into the technology. Potential system advocates,
not seeing their interests realized in the technology, refused to align around the technology and it
was eventually withdrawn.
Other critical Latourian features employed include immutable mobiles (Latour, 1990), avoiding the
insertion of divides (Latour, 1987) and a genealogical view of history (Latour, 1992). Immutable mo-
biles are techniques for capturing data about distant events or things in such a way that captured data
can travel to distant centres without the need for the object itself. Paper records and data captured
digitally are examples; both enable the faithful transport of data over distance. Divides in the Latou-
rian sense are insertions in continuities that make the subject appear mysterious and without origins.
These include time divides (the information age as completely different from preceding times), micro–
macro divides as separate events rather than a change in the size and scale of interacting local actor-
networks, and human non-human divides that artificially separate actants into distinct and separate
units, ignoring how each defines the other in interaction. Finally, to understand the present we must
trace the path(s) actually taken from the past to the present rather than introduce assumptions about
the linear nature of history, a bias we might introduce by starting in the present and looking to the
past to understand present day thinking.
3.1. Data gathering and analysis
Competition or controversy is important for identifying which actants to follow. When there is an
active contest, actants and their networks advocating for competing agendas are visible (Latour, 1987;
Scott & Wagner, 2003). Their words, actions and relationships can be observed and traced. The audit
represented a moment of controversy, privacy versus the status quo. The controversy appeared to
close with the black box ‘‘historical purposes and practices”. During the course of our research we
came across a number of controversies around MVR data, and these controversies were instructive
for revealing what was oftentimes hidden and out of sight.
The goal of ANT research is to describe the process through which diverse actor-networks came to
produce and sustain ontology. ‘‘In order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the dan-
ger, the amorality, or the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network” (Latour,
1991, p. 130). To do this we first immersed ourselves in the immediate controversy around the privacy
audit.
After conducting 6 interviews with audit participants and gathering and analyzing related docu-
ments, we realized that the research site was going to explode into webs of actor-networks. Initially2 Latour uses the term agent here but more normally employs the term actor or actant; the latter term to avoid the human only
implications of the word actor. We use the expression actor-network here to stress nothing exists by itself, it exists and comes to
be defined in interactions or through relations with other things.
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the relevant fields of networks around the MVR data. Over time it became apparent that the critical
actant on which we needed to focus was the data itself, in particular moments of controversy around
the data as this is when actor-networks are rendered visible. In the initial process of developing an
understanding of the privacy audit outcome we encountered sketchy references to an earlier contro-
versy over the data. Over the next two years, we traced and fleshed out that controversy and, through
tracing identified actor-networks, discovered four less visible controversies. For each controversy we
immersed ourselves, searching for and gathering data and conducting interviews where possible for
recollections and the identification of any other possible data sources on the particular controversy.
Essential questions asked of each controversy were,
(a) What triggered the controversy?
(b) What actor-networks are active and identifiable in the controversy?
(c) What actor-networks are invoked or spoken for in the controversy?
(d) What are the cited motivations for actor-networks, visible or spoken for?
(e) What actor-networks are new in this controversy and what ones have been present before?
(f) How was this particular controversy resolved, if it was?
(g) What is the relationship between this controversy and prior and future controversies?
As we became immersed in the various controversies we came to appreciate the similarities and
differences between the controversies and came to realize that the outcome of the privacy audit rep-
resented the culmination of a history marked by periodic shocks that had abruptly altered the trajec-
tory of subsequent events. In other words, we came to realize that we could not explain the present by
looking into the past but rather needed to explain the present by articulating the past embedded in it.3
In reflexively attempting to articulate our understanding and describe each episode and their relation-
ships we identified gaps in our understanding and sought out and gathered additional information. In
the latter stages, analysis, understanding and describing through writing were intertwined and iterative.
3.2. Data sources
The findings reported are based on interviews, analysis of interview transcripts and gathered doc-
uments. In total 16 in-person interviews were conducted in Alberta generating 12 h of recordings that
were subsequently transcribed. Seventeen telephone interviews were also conducted (some of them
were follow-ups on earlier in-person interviews) and notes on the conversations were taken. Exten-
sive use was made of email and written correspondence for individuals or organizations outside Alber-
ta, where the events took place.
Table 2 lists the most significant interviews (all conducted on the condition of anonymity). These
interviews included individuals involved in the privacy audit, a member of the FOIP Review Commit-
tee (multiple times), current employees involved with the MVR, former government cabinet ministers
and former employees of the Alberta and Manitoba Motor Vehicle Branch (responsible for the MVR).
Phone interviews were also conducted with individuals knowledgeable about the firms buying MVR
data.4 Interviews were used primarily as sources of information about key actants and events in order
to then identify and gather documents. Interviews were never used as the primary source of information
due to the potential for biased recall of information. This potential was evident in a number of
interviews.
Table 3 lists the key documents gathered and analyzed in the course of this research. The starting
point was the minutes of the meetings of the FOIP Review Committee and the Privacy Audit report. An
early interview revealed the existence and location of an unpublished history of the Motor Vehicle
Branch and the author. Other provincial privacy acts that formed the basis of the Alberta Freedom
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act were also gathered and analyzed. Over 300 h were spent
in the Alberta provincial archives examining records dating back to the early 1900s. That search3 This is a genealogical non-linear view of history that Latour shares with Foucault and Nietzsche (Latour, 1993).
4 Our guarantees of anonymity mean that we have to be somewhat vague on the details.
Table 3
Significant source documents.
Key documents Sevzen hundred pages of the minutes of the FOIP Review Committee, 1996–1997
Privacy Audit report, 1997
Unpublished history of the Motor Vehicle Branch, 1906–1960
Privacy acts of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan
Internal Ministerial and department records, the Alberta Provincial Archives including (a) correspondence
with Polk (1960s–1970s), (b) correspondence around sale of MVR data (1960s–1980s), (c) a partially
completed legal research project on the sale of MVR data (1979)
Alberta Government Hansards 1960–2000 (official record of statements made in the Alberta Legislature)
Legislation governing the MVR, 1906–2000
Documents from the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives
Companies Office Manitoba, provincial company registry
A report to the Alberta Legislature of the Special Select Committee on Invasion of Privacy, 1969
Table 2
Significant interviews.
Interviews Members of the privacy 1996–1997 audit team and Alberta Registriesa
Member of the FOIP Review Committee (multiple times)
Current employees of Alberta Registries (responsible for the MVR)
Former Alberta government cabinet ministers (1950s–1990)
Ten former employees of the Alberta Motor Vehicle Branch (1941–1999)
Two former employees of the Manitoba Motor Vehicle Branch (1940s–1970s)
Key retired individuals familiar with organizations buying MVR
a Alberta Registries is an umbrella organization for a number of provincial registries, including the MVR.
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Over 50 h were spent researching and analyzing Government Hansards (detailed records of govern-
ment deliberations in the Legislature) and an equal amount of time was involved in tracing the evo-
lution of MVR legislation from 1906 to 2000. A later search in the Saskatchewan Provincial Archives
uncovered evidence of the sale of MVR data as early as in 1926 to Wiggins Systems Limited (Wiggins)
and a 1951 mailing list produced by the same company. A document acquired from the Companies
Office in Manitoba revealed Wiggins’ bankruptcy in 1958 and the reasons for it. Finally interviews re-
vealed a controversy around the sale of MVR data in 1969 leading to a report prepared for the govern-
ment of Alberta.
In what follows, we present the findings forward in time in five general streams. First, we identify
and briefly discuss a somewhat patchy history from 1906 to the late 1950s that includes technologies
no longer used. Second, we reveal evidence of concern in the early 1960s, within the government,
around the legality of the sale of MVR data and rising privacy concerns. This period also sees the intro-
duction of a new actant, the modern computer. Third, in 1972, a full blown controversy emerges
revealing a wealth of information about actor-networks aroundMVR data. Fourth, almost immediately
after the crisis a key actants attempts to narrowly interpret restrictions resulting from the 1972 crisis,
threatening to reignite the controversy. Finally, we see continued but subdued threads of concern
about the sale of MVR data through the 1970s into the 1980s that later appeared in the privacy audit
of 1996–1997.
In presenting our findings in terms of distinct episodes related to controversies we realize that we
are arbitrarily dividing time. This is for presentation purposes only. Some tensions underlying each
controversy pre-date and continue through each controversy. We also acknowledge the difficulty,
as does McGrath (2002), of condensing a wealth of information within the constrained space of a jour-
nal article.
4. Findings
Our findings are presented as episodes, identified in Table 4, evolving around a key controversy




Under the Radar (no controversies identified) 1926–1960
Legality and Rising Privacy Concerns (the computer is enrolled) 1960–1971
All Access to MVR Data Ceases 1972
Attempted Function Creep 1973
Uncontrolled Growth (computer access accounts, privacy and liability concerns) 1974–1980
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forward to Attempted Function Creep and Uncontrolled Growth, leading to the Privacy Audit of 1996–
1997.
4.1. Under the radar (no controversies identified)
Sometime before 1941, two key pieces of technology were employed in the motor vehicle registra-
tion process: the Graphotype and Addressograph machines. These machines together produced seven
copies of the motor vehicle registration that included detailed information about the vehicle and its
owner. The seventh copy, known as the ‘‘wiggins” form was batched and periodically mailed to a com-
pany in Winnipeg Manitoba, Wiggins Systems Limited (Hogg, 1985). Archival evidence indicates that
Wiggins paid three-quarter of a cent for each registration in 1928 (Department of the Provincial Sec-
retary, 1928). The actor-network constituting the registration process continued to provide Wiggins
with this information until it filed for bankruptcy in 1958. According to the trustee, the bankruptcy
was caused by a loss of cash flow, ‘‘Primarily caused by the loss of volume due to the automotive
trades taking their direct mailing contract from him [Charles S. Wiggins] to an agency operating in
Eastern Canada” (Canadian Credit Men’s Trust Association Limited, 1958).
Little is known of Wiggins, but a three-inch thick document dated 1951 was discovered entitled,
‘‘Wiggins Systems Limited Mailing List”, with the sub-heading, ‘‘Make Good use of your Mailing Lists,
It will Push Up your Sales” (Wiggins Systems Limited, 1951, italics in the original). The document lists
all registered vehicles in Regina, Saskatchewan and is organized around the vehicle license number
providing the vehicle owner’s name, address, and vehicle serial number, make and style. As Regina
is a relatively small city, it is reasonable to assume that lists were produced for other Western Cana-
dian cities as well. As hundreds of thousands of copies of registration forms were sent to Wiggins, we
can only imagine the scale and scope of the actor-networks associated with Wiggins that were in-
volved in the manual labour of sorting, organizing and producing lists, as well as those involved in
actually buying the lists. The technologies employed in registering motor vehicles continued to be
embedded in the MVR process until the 1960s (the process was computerized in 1962 in Alberta)
and the paper based release of MVR data continued after Wiggins, although it was now released to
a different actor-network, the R.L. Polk Company of Canada.
Very little is known about this period or the rationale of the ‘‘wiggins” form. The described method
of registering motor vehicles was a practice inherited by employees who started in the early 1940s
and extensive searches through department and ministerial files in the provincial archives of Alberta
and Saskatchewan reveal no additional information; the practice did not appear to be on anyone’s ra-
dar. What carries forward from this period is the sale of MVR data, the technology embedded in the
actor-network registering vehicles, and the ‘‘wiggins” form. What is different in the next period is
the emergence of the issue in ministerial records, the start of actor-networks coalescing around pri-
vacy and the introduction of the modern computer.
4.2. Legality and Rising Privacy Concerns (the computer is enrolled)
The bankruptcy of Wiggins, the continued production of the ‘‘wiggins” form, and the appearance of
Polk appear to have drawn the attention of more senior government officials, within the Ministry of
Highways, to a practice that had already been in operation for over thirty years. Correspondence re-
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absence of legislative authority to sell MVR data,5 in a period of increased concerns about privacy
generally.
Throughout the early 1960s senior officials within his department advised the Minister of High-
ways, Gordon Taylor, to change the legislation to legitimate the sale of MVR data. This was never done,
but in 1962 the Taylor actor-network changed the regulations to the Motor Vehicle Act (the legislation
governing the MVR), which were expanded to authorize, for the first time, the ‘‘bulk” sale of MVR data,
identifying Polk as the sole recipient.6
The motivations of this actor-network to advise or to take actions which supported the continued
dissemination MVR data, with Polk at the centre, is unclear.7 In addition to this general inclination, it
would appear that the central actant, Taylor, had an issue with Polk having an unfair market advantage
as the sole recipient of the data. This was borne out in an interview with him in 2001 and reflected in
notes he created for his files.
‘‘With the use of a magnetic tape and the computer, it was possible to make the information avail-
able to anyone. The price is 1 cent for each registration if the purchaser supplies the magnetic tape
plus $900 for the microfilm of new registrations” (Taylor, 1968).
Uncertainty around the practice is evident in internal correspondence. In 1967, Taylor surveyed
other provinces about their use of MVR data. Response indicated that all provincial actor-networks
sold MVR data to Polk, with two provinces (Manitoba and Quebec that had also computerized the reg-
istration process) considering the sale of the MVR data to a national direct marketing company in
Montreal, O.E. McIntyre. Taylor also requested information from Polk about its use of MVR informa-
tion. The response indicated that the information was used primarily by the automobile industry to
help an associated network of manufacturers and suppliers plan production and locate new dealer-
ships. The letter focused on the use of MVR data for the War Amputees Association of Canada Key
Tag program8 and assisting General Motors in a vehicle recall involving all 1965 Chevrolets and Pontiacs
(Heil, 1968). The use of MVR data for direct marketing was acknowledged for automotive manufacturers
and ‘‘[m]ajor oil companies, tire manufacturers and other companies that more or less are allied with the
automotive industry”, but the spokesperson indicated that this was a minor part of Polk’s business.
Taylor did pursue the possibility of making ‘‘the information available to anyone”. His staff, under
his direction, entered into and completed negotiations on the sale of MVR data on computer tapes to
McIntyre (to start in 1968). In preparation, this actor-network again changed the regulations to the
Motor Vehicle Administration Act, replacing all specific references to Polk with the general statement
that the Minister ‘‘may supply registration data in bulk form”.9
As these events took place there is evidence of increased concerns about privacy reflected in a let-
ters from citizens and a government study undertaken in 1969 on privacy (Simpson et al., 1970). Let-
ters from individuals objecting to the sale of MVR data were found in the Alberta Archives collection.
Responses from Taylor’s actor-network, however, clearly supported the sale of this information and
used Polk’s statements about the benefits to the automobile industry as justification. This is reflected
in the following sample response to such letters.
‘‘While it is true that under the provisions of the regulations this information may be sold to listing
companies, it should be pointed out that this does not necessarily support the assumption made by
the writer of the article that the sale of such information is the cause of your receiving advertising
material in the mail. Because similar articles have been published in the past, we made some inves-5 All motor vehicle legislation and related regulations were reviewed, from 1905 to 1962, and the sale of MVR data does not ever
appear to have been explicitly authorized.
6 Alberta Regulation 417/62.
7 Polk paid $7637.47 for MVR data in 1967, a relatively small number, making it hard to argue that the motives were entirely
8 The War Amputees Key Tag program, using MVR data, mailed every registered vehicle owner a key ring tag. If keys were found
they could be placed in any mailbox where they would be sent to the War Amputees who would mail them to the owner. Key tag
recipients were invited to make a donation for these key tags.
9 Alberta Regulation 453/67.
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the main user of this information is the motor vehicle industry which, in many cases, has been
instrumental in helping rather than hindering the users of motor vehicles” (Taylor, 1969).10
Unable to prove that MVR data was used for direct marketing and up against actants aligned with
Polk and the automobile industry, individuals questioning the practice were on their own. In these let-
ters, though, we see the initial formation of actor-networks around the concept of privacy. At this
point these networks were relatively weak in the face of significant others, such as the Taylor ac-
tor-network.
However, the significant change of trajectory towards the increased use of MVR data for direct mar-
keting purposes did not materialize. McIntyre, speaking for its actual and potential network, made a
fateful decision in deciding to defer enacting the contract until all other provinces were able to provide
computer tapes, something that did not happen for another six years. Instead, two years later the gov-
ernment changed and a new actant in the form of a new Minister of Highways with a different orien-
tation took over responsibility for the MVR.
4.3. All Access to MVR Data Ceases
In 1971 Taylor’s party lost the election and new Minister of Highways, Clarence Copithorne, intro-
duced a different orientation into the mix. Copithorne had been a member of the legislative committee
studying privacy only two years earlier and it appears that privacy was important to him (Simpson
et al., 1970). According to an interviewee, it was Polk’s practice to monitor changes in critical provin-
cial actor-networks and to arrange to meet with them and keep the Polk actor-network functioning.
The change in government in Alberta and Copithorne’s quick reaction to the following event happened
before this meeting could occur.
Copithorne received, from another cabinet minister, copies of four letters mailed to government
employees from Laurier Life Insurance (Hohol, 1972). The address labels attached to these letters in-
cluded the make and age of the employee’s vehicle, the gender of the employee and other unidentifi-
able pieces of data (Exhibit 1). The source of the information was clear and within four days
Copithorne made the following announcement in the Alberta Legislature.
‘‘Mr. Speaker, in the past, information regarding those who have bought license plates in the Prov-
ince of Alberta has been made available for a fee to commercial companies, which has contributed
to the invasion of privacy throughmail. Mr. Speaker, I wish to announce that commencing with this
year’s registration, data in bulk form will no longer be supplied, either to individuals or firms”
(Alberta Hansard, 1972).
The actions of Copithorne’a actor-network destabilized Polk’s network, exposing Polk’s vulnerabil-
ity as the network spokesperson. Copithorne refused Polk’s initial lobbying efforts to restart the flow
of MVR data, demanding detailed information about Polk’s use of MVR data. The response indicates
that, in 1971, Polk had sent almost two million mailings on behalf of its network to Alberta residents,
listed in Table 5 (Heil, 1972).
An extended but largely invisible network of organizations had evolved around the use of this very
accurate data (updated by motorists at least annually11). Polk itself had previously been invisible in
these mailings as, like credit bureaus today, Polk produced the mailings using letters and envelopes sup-
plied by these organizations. Polk’s name never appeared in the mailings.
Pressure to restart the flow of information to Polk came from a number of actor-networks aligned
around Polk’s access to MVR data. These include the War Amps who relied on Polk’s computers to pre-
pare mailing lists for its Key Tag program, the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, Cummins
Diesel Power Ltd. and a magazine publisher. These actants were not necessarily speaking in support
of Polk though, as is evident in the following quote. Cummins Diesel indicated that it was willing to10 These letters were written in response to newspaper articles or personal experience. This representative response cites most of
the justifications used by the government in responding to letters of objection.
11 More often if vehicle owners move, they must report address changes within 90 days or face fines.
Exhibit 1. MVR data appearing on mailing labels.
Table 5
Distribution – mailings made by Polk into Alberta, 1971.
Automobile recalls 83,737 MacLean Hunter 4,215
War Amputees 494,822 Ogilvy and Mather (American Express) 50,000
Foster Advertising, Toronto 288,902 Simpsons Sears 21,500
MacLaren Advertising, Toronto 362,799 Sovereign Seat Covers, Ontario 188,650
Postal Promotions, Toronto 32,964 Automobile Dealers – general 141,275
National Consumer Marketing 20,000 Oil and Gas Companies 143,200
Readers’ Digest 12,400 Others 69,856
Mil Mac Publication 1737 Total 1,916,057
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position of spokespersons.
‘‘We are not aware nor are we interested in circumstances surrounding your decision with R.L. Polk
however if your decision is firm we would like to arrange to obtain from you registration informa-
tion so that we may process it” (Koziak, 1972).
Eight months after cutting off access to MVR data, Copithorne advised his staff to begin negotiating
a new contract with Polk. While the flow of bulk MVR data was restarted, the subsequent contract
contained clauses limiting the use of personal data for statistical and vehicle recall purposes only. It
is unclear whether this was the event that sparked similar actions by other provincial actor-networks,
or whether it would have happened anyway given a growing increase in those willing to align around
privacy, but over the next few years, other provincial actor-networks imposed similar restrictions on
the Polk actor-network.
Unfortunately Copithorne died in the late 1970s and his records in the archives are limited. A num-
ber of interviewees offered anecdotal evidence that indicate that pressure was applied to resolve the
issue in favour of Polk. This included distant federal Members of Parliament (in Ontario), aligned with
automobile manufacturing networks located in their ridings. Significant pressure also emerged from
politicians, individuals and newspaper editorials aligning in favour of the War Amputee’s program.
This is an example of actants acting locally for local reasons. None of these actants was involved in
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data and yet their actions, for different reasons, had the effect of supporting the Polk actor-network.
4.4. Attempted Function Creep
Within one year, though, Polk risked reigniting the controversy in seeking Copithorne’s approval to
issue a comprehensive survey to new car buyers in Alberta, on behalf of one of its network members,
the Ford Motor Company Limited.
‘‘It is the term ‘‘market research analysis” [limiting phrase in Polk’s new contract with Alberta]
which we question since, in our terminology, this includes surveys of car buyers and owners in
order to determine preferences and other information of value to the manufacturers in their future
planning. These have been carried on for many years and we continue to do such market research
studies in other provinces” (Heil, 1973).
The new contract contained a clause that motor vehicle manufacturers were not to get the names
of registered owners of vehicles. The survey, attached to Heil’s letter, was to be sent to all new car buy-
ers in Alberta, not just Ford buyers. The multi-paged survey asked questions about the vehicle pur-
chased, factors that affected the purchase decision and the dealer experience. It concluded with
personal questions about how the car was paid for, other cars owned in the household, and questions
about the buyer’s gender, age, marital status, the number of children living in the household, the last
grade of school completed by the buyer, the family’s income, the buyer’s occupation and name and
address.
This attempt to narrowly interpret restrictions recently placed on the use of this personal informa-
tion was met with a blunt response.
‘‘Mr. Heil, I must admit I am somewhat surprised at your latest request, especially in view of the
fact that the use you now propose for the statistical data we provide is exactly the same use which
prompted the discontinuation of our previous agreement” (Copithorne, 1972).
Thus, while Polk did regain access to Alberta MVR data, Polk’s attempt to reestablish its role as a
central actant-network in national direct marketing and market research networks failed with the
enforcement of the restrictions. Unlike the actor-network involving Wiggins that collapsed abruptly
with its bankruptcy in 1958, Polk’s centrality as an actant in the use and dissemination of gradually
diminished from 1972 onward, as others provinces enacted similar restrictions.
4.5. Uncontrolled Growth (computer access accounts)
While the direct marketing aspect of actor-networks around MVR data never materialized in the
case of McIntyre and faded away over time with Polk, changes in computer and communications tech-
nology enabled other possibilities that were acted upon, with the modern computer being enlisted in
actor-networks in newways. The digital capture of data on magnetic tapes had earlier created the pos-
sibility of capturing the data once and selling it repeatedly, enabling the earlier deal with McIntyre.
Over a relatively short period of time databases and improvements in telecommunication technology
enabled something different, and actions were taken. Local actor-networks within government cre-
ated search accounts for ministry approved outsiders to access MVR data for a fee. The gravitation
of actants towards MVR data available this way got out of hand very quickly.
According to a government study in the late 1970s, ‘‘Officials of the department have spied defects
in the practice of imparting information to whomever requests it merely upon payment of the fee”
(Solicitor General’s Department, 1979, p. 4). The ‘‘spied defects” included a lack of legislative authority
for selling the information, vague grounds for initially establishing an account, a lack of audit trails on
subsequent searches and little or no attempt to assess the continued need for particular accounts. The
report indicated that there were approximately 1000 search account holders in 1979. The largest ac-
count holders included bank branches, finance companies, collection agencies, insurance companies,
car dealerships, private investigation companies, department stores, a tracing company, a major gro-
cery store chain and others. According to the report,
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Vehicle Division] who are sensitive to the security issues suggested by the wide disclosure of per-
sonal data” (Solicitor General’s Department, 1979, p. 5).
Correspondence within the Solicitor General’s Department, which had become responsible for the
MVR since 1975, indicate that the range of concerns included privacy issues, concerns about the type
and amount of information released, liability issues around the use of the data to find the addresses of
women, and the propriety of releasing any information.
From departmental documents and the government study a recurring theme of internal uncer-
tainty about the propriety of selling MVR data seemed to exist. However, policy changes attempting
to limit access to MVR data tended to be ad-hoc and inconsistently enforced.
‘‘As will be repeated throughout this study, this change in policy [limiting access to individuals]
reflects a doubt within the MVD about whether this traditional service is a proper function of
the Division at all” (Solicitor General’s Department, 1979, p. 10).
From this point on no further documentary threads suggesting the existence of a controversy
around the dissemination of MVR data are evident. The fact that less than twenty years later the gov-
ernment requested the privacy audit, out of concern for ensuring that ‘‘adequate privacy practices are
adopted” (Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner and the Auditor General of Alberta,
1998, p. 3), suggests that concerns around the dissemination of MVR data had not disappeared.
5. Discussion
5.1. Constitution of ‘‘historical purposes and practices”
Our ANT analysis of the constitution of the black box, ‘‘historical purposes and practices”, reveals an
absence of purpose. Rather than finding some underlying continuity of identifiable purposeful action
we instead found a series of actions taken by local actor-networks within government that have al-
tered, sometimes sharply, the shape and scale of interconnected actor-networks that have gravitated
to and aligned around MVR data over the course of the last 80 years. There has been no continuous
purpose.
There have as well been a number of continuities. Firstly, the data has been in action and been inte-
gral to the formation of actor-networks for the last 80 years. Secondly, documentary evidence reveals
that for at least the last 50 years there have been fairly constant questions about the legitimacy of the
practice itself. Finally, the most consistent and overarching constant has been the forgetting of history;
each time questions about the practice have arisen, they have appeared as though new and without a
past.
Sharp evidence of this forgetting of history is reflected in the concerns raised in the 1979 study that
‘‘spied defects” in both the rationale of the practice of releasing this data at all, as well as the lack of
control over the process. The forgetting of history is clearly reflected in the remarkable similarity of
the ‘‘spied defects” in 1979 to the issues raised in the privacy audit of 1997, compared in Table 6.
The only substantial difference between the two events is the 1997 recommendation to adopt fair
information principles (FIP) as privacy’s representative in the enactment of balance; FIP did not exist
and were not part of an actor-network in 1979.12
5.2. Explaining the tipping of the scale in favour of ‘‘historical purposes and practices”
That the ‘‘historical purposes and practices” argument was successful without revealing its sub-
stance, begs questions about the substance of privacy’s representative on the other side of the scale.
We will only speak to this briefly here as it clear that, since the scales in this enactment of balance12 FIP, developed by the OECD and adopted in Canada were not published until 1980 (Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development, 1980).
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resentative possesses little actual substance.
In the request for the audit, the deputy minister appealed to the FOIP actor-network as privacy’s
representative,
‘‘The disclosure of this information [personal information in data banks], and. . .ensuring adequate
privacy practices are adopted – especially as they relate to the FOIP [Freedom of Information and
Privacy Protection] Act – is important to us” (Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
and the Auditor General of Alberta, 1998, p. 3).
The privacy sections of Canadian FOIP acts are based on fair information principles (FIP) developed
by the OECD (Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, 1999, p. 1). The substance of these
principles and their enactment in Canadian legislation has been discussed in depth elsewhere (Bonner
& Chiasson, 2005), however, a couple of points are worth noting. Firstly, FIP were developed largely by
actor-networks with a vested interest in ensuring the mobility of data. FIP are not privacy principles
but rules about data that, once met, permit the movement of data. FIP have become a black box
embedded in many actor-networks where they are privacy’s unquestioned representative. Secondly,
Canadian public sector privacy legislation (Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy legisla-
tion) is integrated with access to government information legislation. Under the access to information
side of the legislation, Canadians can access general information possessed by the government as well
as any information the government has about them (with some exceptions to both) at no cost.
In practice every provincial actor-network act exempts the use of MVR data from FOIP legislation.
From interviews in Alberta, the reason cited most often for this exemption is that if the provincial MVR
was included under FOIP legislation, individuals could request their driver’s abstract under the access
to information side of the legislation, for instance, and bypass the fee system in place. Legislative ac-
tor-networks have decided that it is easier to exempt these agencies from FOIP altogether. Thus, the
actual substance of privacy’s representative (FOIP) and its potential for restrictions on access to MVR
in this enactment of balance was decided in a series of earlier balancing acts involving actor-networks
(FIP and then FOIP), that limited, in the first instance, the definition of privacy, thereby ensuring its
mobility and, in the second instance, created an outright exemption of MVR data from the scope of
the legislation.
Based on our findings we have to conclude that the success of the appeal to unarticulated history
rests on a limited conception of privacy embedded in the FIP–FOIP actor-networks and failure on the
part of other actor-networks (legislative and media for instance) to probe for the substance of histor-
ical purposes and practices, granting it a substance that it does not possess. We cannot say if there
were undiscovered and undocumented behind the scene actor-networks acting to maintain the status
quo, but we can say that if balance is a useful and meaningful metaphor then its enactment must be
transparent and fully examinable and examined.
5.3. Insights gained and challenges raised through our ANT analysis
We wish to explore two critical challenges to an appeal to the metaphor of balance, deriving from
our extended historical investigation employing the lens of ANT. Firstly, within an organization, where
does the enactment of balance take place? This challenge relates to what an ‘organization’ knows and
can actually say about its practices. Secondly, what does an organization and those within it enacting
balance know of actor-networks that extend beyond organizational boundaries? This relates to data as
an actant in the creation of actor-networks that gravitate towards and network around personal data
once it is made available.
5.3.1. Locus of decision-making in enactments of balance
Our findings support those identified in the literature that argue the existence of an imbalance of
power or information between organizations and individuals, in favour of organizations. Individuals
have been largely absent in enactments of balance and in many instances been unaware of the very
existence of the practice itself. The challenge our investigation raises, though, is about the nature
of organizational decision-making and organizational knowledge about uses made of personal
Table 6
1979 spied defects versus 1997 privacy audit findings.
1979 spied defects (Solicitor General’s
Department, 1979, p. 4)
1997 findings/unresolved privacy audit recommendations
A lack of legislative authority for selling the
information
No evidence of legislative authority or informed consent from the individual to
whom the information relatesa
Vague grounds for initially establishing an
account
Weak controls over the issuance of search accounts granting access to MVR
datab
A lack of audit trails on subsequent searches The absence of audits by the government on uses made of the informationb
Little or no attempt to assess the continued
need for particular accounts
Auditor General Department’s discovery of search accounts in its namea
The advisability of applying fair information principles (FIP) to govern the
collection and use of MVR data in light of the partial exclusion of the MVR from
the privacy act (FOIP)b
a Reported in privacy audit report.
b Unresolved audit recommendations.
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tions about where in organizations enactments of balance occur; who enacts balance and the level
of knowledge these actor-networks actually possess.
Our findings make it difficult to view an organization as an entity, but rather a loose collection of
actor-networks. ‘The government’ as such did not make decisions about MVR data in our study, those
decisions were made by local actor-networks and we found repeated examples of local actor-network
knowledge being weak and rather tenuous. Wiggins and its actor-networks appear to be an historical
organizational mystery supported by actor-networks in which the Graphotype and Addressograph
technologywas embedded. Subsequently, Taylor’s actor-networks supported those of Polk but with lit-
tle real knowledge aboutwhatwas actually donewith the data. The push to expand the use ofMVR data
for marketing purposes, in signing contracts with McIntyre, was knowledge that only Taylor’s actor-
network within the government possessed. Further evidence of the continued lack of organizational
knowledge about balancing acts is reflected in the commissioned study in the late 1970s by other ac-
tor-networks within the government around search accounts; the weak basis for issuing them, their
lack of expiry date and the lack of audits conducted on MVR data uses. This uncertainty around search
accounts was evident in the 1970’s study and again in the audit findings of the late 1990s. Further, ac-
tor-networks involved in the execution of the privacy audit do not appear to have been aware of the
same questions having been asked by other government actor-networks within the last 20 years.
There is a more recent example reinforcing our sense of organizations as a collection of loosely
aligned actor-networks. An opposition Member of the Legislature (MLA) and a member of the FOIP Re-
view Committee, Pamela Paul, raised questions about the impact of selling MVR data in instances of
potentially violent domestic breakups. Registering change of addresses with the MVR is required by
law and a reading of the minutes of the meeting suggest she was quite disturbed to find out that any-
one with a search account could access new addresses (Alberta Legislature, 1998, p. 10). This elected
official and law maker of the same organization that sells MVR data was taken aback by the existence
of the practice.
This view of an organization raises questions about the organizational calculus involved in enact-
ments of balance, the necessary counterpart of Culnan and Armstrong’s (1999) ‘‘privacy calculus”, de-
fined as ‘‘an assessment [by individuals] that their personal information will be used fairly and they
will not suffer negative consequences” (p. 106). This theory suggests that individuals actively calculate
and attach weights to the statements of organizational spokespersons (privacy policies, in store state-
ments, public statements, etc.). Yet our study suggests that a focus on the organizational level as a unit
of analysis is problematic as ‘organizations’ do not make decisions; local actor-networks within orga-
nizations do. Not only that, but we also saw repeated examples of local actor-networks engaging in a
form of calculus for the organizational as a whole, an activity that was not well-informed or consistent
over time.
The local nature of the organizational calculus with limited information leading to decision-making
and action is cause for concern as this is where acceptable levels of ‘substance’ and ‘justification’ are
determined and where actual enactments of balance occur. Obviously this does not give all local actor-
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exists that some planned or actual actions taken by local actor-networks can meet with resistance
from other actor-networks within an organization. Our study, though, documents 80 years of actions
taken with minimal challenge and little demonstrated substantive benefits. This leads us to speculate
that, as in the case here, once actions taken have been in place for a while, their continued success and
justification may benefit from appeals to history that add substance that they might not otherwise
possess.
We have spoken so far about the locus of decision-making within and on behalf of organizations,
but the insights provided by the ANT lens and the time period covered by our investigation also raises
concerns about organizational knowledge and acknowledgment of actor-networks that form around
available data, extending beyond organizational walls.
5.3.2. Data as an actant in the formation networks
Our investigation reveals that the actor-networks emerging around the use of personal data are not
new. They pre-date the wide adoption of computer technology and certainly the advent of distributed
computing and the internet. The challenge arising is how to study or understand issues of privacy
without explicitly probing for, acknowledging and incorporating the full life of data beyond its original
collection point within organizational walls. Our study reveals that data is not a static artifact, but
rather is embedded in and is a catalyst for the formation of many different actor-networks. In this
sense data is clearly an actant that has been active in the creation of networks over the last 80 years
and whose physical manifestation (paper, digital tapes and then stored in databases) has played a role
in creating and dissolving networks. It played a central role in destabilizing the Polk actor-networks
with its appearance on mailing labels (Exhibit 1). ANT as a tool for revealing data as an actant in cre-
ating and sustaining networks is enlightening but at the same time disturbing, as we are not aware of
any studies that have focused on actual networked action around data. The one exception is Smith
(1993), although his study focused on actor-networks within specific firms.
For instance, Polk is defined by data, starting with the founder of the company compiling lists of
shopkeepers within walking distance of train stations, for travelling salesmen in 1870. By 1968 Polk
was generating 60-million dollars a year through its lists (Time Magazine, 1968). Similarly credit bu-
reaus are defined by data, evolving from black list record keepers (lists of people who demonstrated
lack of creditworthiness) in the early 1900s to collectors of files on everyone’s credit history (Rule
et al., 1980).
If a picture is worth a thousand words we would like to invoke the image of a section of land (one
square mile) of corn, just before the harvest. From a bird’s-eye view the field is an impressive sight, a
tall dense forest of leafy green as far as the eye can see. From a ground level view, outside of the corn-
field, this same density of nine foot tall corn obscures details of the actual content of the field as, be-
yond the first ten feet of the edge of the cornfield, details are lost in a sea of green stocks and leaves.
What lies beyond is unknown. With this image in mind, our investigation reveals that no actor-net-
work group within the government, including the critical actor-networks enacting local balance,
had a bird’s-eye view of what was done with MVR data. Thus we situate the data collector actor-net-
work, the within-government actor-networks responsible for the MVR, at the edge of the cornfield
accessible to individuals.
Personal data provided to the government at the edge of the field then enters into the cornfield
transmitted along network lines to other actor-networks situated in partially cleared pockets within
the field. Over the course of the last eight decades transmission of personal data was accomplished
with the immutable mobiles of physical paper (the wiggins form), magnetic tapes and finally digital
telecommunication lines providing access to databases. The first destination network node in the
cornfield is known to at least some actor-networks within the government and has in the past in-
cluded Wiggins, Polk, and search account holders. Beyond that first level of transmission, knowledge
about the actual subsequent travels of the data became very sketchy or even unknown to actor-net-
works within the government, those collecting data at the edge of the cornfield and those enacting
balance within the government.
This is one of the key insights that our ANT investigation affords, insights and revelations into the
cornfield itself, by discovering and following the actual actor-networks that have formed around data
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Polk and the government and very real threads, unseen by those within government, connecting the
government to American Express, Readers Digest Sears, and MacLaren Advertising. The Copithorne ac-
tor-network later cut off Polk but did not appear to be aware of the thread connecting the government
through Polk to the War Amputees’ actor-network. These discovered network linkages are now aban-
doned, as is the once direct thread to Wiggins and the connections from there to the Wiggins actor-
network. At present there are direct network connections from some government actor-networks to
search account holders. Yet the observations of the spied defects around search account holders in
1979, repeated in the 1997 privacy audit findings, regarding the vague basis for establishing search
accounts, the lack of audits done and lack of monitoring of the continued need for search accounts,
suggest that we are seeing history repeat itself. Where this data goes, beyond the initial threads estab-
lished by few actor-networks creating search accounts and enacting balance, is uncertain and
unknown.
If the government is unaware of distant actor-networks aligned around MVR data, individuals sup-
plying it know even less. A recent telling example of the lack of individual knowledge of networks
around personal involves Abacus, as it merged with Doubleclick in late 1999. The reports vary in
the details but are consistent in reporting that Abacus held over 2 billion personally identifiable con-
sumer catalog transaction records and that Abacus deals with 1500 retailers (Macavinta, 1999a,
1999b).13 Abacus is not an institution that individuals deal with or even know about. Somehow (and
it would be interesting to explore) actor-networks have aligned around Abacus, catalog companies
and transactional data so that Abacus, way out in the cornfield somewhere has created a market place
of anonymous actor-networks around data, unknown to the individuals supplying data to the catalog
companies at the edge of the cornfield.
While our findings involving a government agency amplifies our concern about this theme, as gov-
ernments tend to be the bodies to which individuals turn to protect privacy, it would be a naive sim-
plifying assumption to assume it is any different in the private sector. In ANT terms, accepting this
assumption without substantiating it would be tantamount to accepting a black box without being
aware of its contents. The existence of organizations and networks made possible by the availability
and mobility of data, such as Abacus, Acxiom, credit bureaus and others, leads us to believe that our
concerns about a lack of knowledge of extended networks around available personal data are just as
likely to exist in the private sector.
6. Conclusion
Before offering concluding comments, we must speak to any potential limitations of our research
methodology.
First, networks and their interactions are potentially endless and the decision to follow particular
threads involves choices based on research interest and researcher understanding. We also found par-
ticular empirical threads leading to dead ends, occasionally because data was simply unavailable (for
instance the origins of the practice itself) or because of resource limitations (we were restricted to lo-
cal provincial archives and could not investigate all provinces). Second, we acknowledge that partic-
ipant viewpoints and archival material can only partially validate our results, given the critical and
reflective involvement of the researchers in the study direction, and the potential influences of undoc-
umented events. Third, such studies produce a wealth of threads, data and information and we had to
restrict our principal focus in this paper to ‘‘historical purposes and practices”, limiting our account of
FIP on privacy’s side of the scale. Our approach of following the data, something we have not seen in
MIS privacy research, necessitated we focus our efforts and presentation on that unique aspect of our
research and the insights it offers. Finally, we can speak only to our understanding of practice in Can-
ada. Similar investigations in the US, Europe, Asia and Australia would shed light on the similarities
and differences between experiences and actions across space.13 An opinion by the Federal Trade Commission of the United States, at around the same time, indicates only 700 catalogers
(Thompson, 2000). Even so, that is 700 unknown catalogers.
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raised important insights and challenges facing IS researchers and practitioners in the area of informa-
tion privacy. Our study raises challenges for privacy researchers to explore and critique actual enact-
ments of balance. If the concept of balance is to be taken seriously then the substances employed on
the scale must be transparent and fully examined. We also believe there is a need to explore the life of
the critical actant in the area of information privacy – the data itself – so that we critically examine
organizational statements about the subsequent use of the data.
Our study confirms the need for and benefit of more historical research in MIS. Specifically, there is
the benefit of understanding the context of the setting under investigation to appreciate the nuances
of the content (Mason, McKenney, & Copeland, 1997) and the conditions of change and of continuity
that accompany the use of IT (Mason et al., 1997). Historical research allows us to evaluate and chal-
lenge assumptions and understanding embedded in current research and aspects of our understand-
ing that might not hold when exposed to the light of time. Such assumptions might include inserting
an arbitrary divide and treating the Internet as a separable domain of concern for information privacy
(Malhorta, Kim, & Agerwal, 2004) and the use of broad organizational assurances in controlled studies
that organizations might not be able to offer in practice (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999).
Overall we feel that a greater focus on the data in information privacy research is a fruitful and nec-
essary avenue of future research. Such research would be fruitful because it would reveal and generate
more knowledge about the travels of data and the unseen actor-networks that emerge around it in dif-
ferent contexts or locations. Such research is necessary if we are going to continue to appeal to the
metaphor of balance. Balance has no meaning except in enactment, and if enactments are in practice
unbalanced, then the metaphor and the discourse around it appear unjustified. This sort of research
would be difficult in purely private sector organizations, because public records about their activities
are often unavailable. Yet, where private sector firms use public sector data, as is the case here, the
transparency required of public bodies may reveal what otherwise remains unknown, unseen and
unacknowledged.
For practitioners, we feel that our research provides some practical insights into understanding the
complexity of contemporary privacy issues by framing them in historical context, revealing a rich
interplay of influences that shape current issues but are often obscured by our focus on the immediate
present. The interpretation of these insights in the unique circumstances facing individual practitio-
ners could lead to alternative visions of the nature of the problem, and through this, alternative solu-
tions. For instance, it is possible that the difficulty that some organizations face in articulating and
defending current organizational practices around personal data is that some of those practices are
relics from the past whose value and purpose are not locally or broadly understood within the orga-
nization. It is also possible that difficulty in defining and defending practices publicly arise from orga-
nizational uncertainty around the networks associated with the organization that have aligned around
the data. If this were discovered to be the case, these would be actionable items derived from the con-
textual understanding of a current issue and are examples of the potential that historical research of-
fers practitioners.
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